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This paper proposes a conceptual land use change model that includes a framework for analyzing the political 
institutional determinants of land use change. The model is used to explain several previous empirical findings and 
to generate testable hypotheses. The government bias for sprawl is addressed in the context of the model. 
Keywords: Land use change, sprawl, sprawl bias, planning and zoning 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In recent years there has been increasing recognition of the importance of studying land and the role 
human beings play in shaping  the land. Much of the  inquiry has focused on patterns of land use 
change. Theories addressing land use change have been offered by such diverse fields as economics, 
urban and regional science, sociology, social physics, environmental history, environmental psychology, 
biology, ecology, and geography (Briassoulis, 2000). Each discipline has offered useful insights into the 
processes of land use change, but to date there is no single unifying theory that integrates the important 
insights from all the relevant disciplines. In particular, when reviewing the literature a gap in land use 
change  theory  and  modeling  becomes  evident.  Many  developers  of  land use  change  models 
acknowledge the importance of political institutional factors. Hubacek and Vazques (2002), for example, 
note: “Institutional factors set the frame influencing (economic) behavior…Public regulations, such as 
community plans, zoning ordinances, rent controls, subdivision regulations, building codes, and laws 
pertaining  to  mortgage  finance  shape  the development  and  use  of  real  property”.  Yet  despite  the 
general acknowledgement that institutions play an integral role in the land use change process, and 
despite the existence of numerous empirical investigations into the impacts of government policy on 
land use, a theoretical framework for analyzing the relationships among various political institutional 
factors and land use change has been lacking (see for example Briassoulis, 2000 or National Center for 
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The primary purpose of this article is to propose a conceptual model of land use change that includes a 
framework for incorporating political institutional factors in the land use change process. The basic land 
use change model developed herein draws extensively from existing theories and models of land use 
change, and the political institutional framework is informed by public choice theory. The secondary 
purpose of the article is to use the conceptual model to explain some empirical results researchers have 
found regarding the relationship between the political institutional environment of a given locality and the 
prevalence of sprawl. Extensions of the conceptual model, including testable hypotheses, are also 
proposed. 
2. SPRAWL: DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT 
An analysis of the political institutional dimensions of land use change would be incomplete without a 
discussion of sprawl, as it represents the most critical land use issue in many regions. There is no 
single accepted definition of sprawl. Burchell et al. (2005) characterize sprawl as “a type of development 
with…(1)  unlimited  outward  extension  into  undeveloped  areas,  (2)  low  density,  and  (3)  leapfrog 
development”. Burchell et al. (2005) further note that “sprawl is not simply development at less than 
maximum density; rather, it refers to development at a low relative density…”. Kolankiewicz and Beck 
(2001) define sprawl as “the rural acres lost as an Urbanized Area spreads outward over a period of 
time,” an Urbanized Area consisting of a central city and its contiguous suburbs. Fulton et al. (2001) 
distinguish a sprawling area from a “densifying” area as follows:  “If land is being consumed at a faster 
rate than population growth, then [the area] can be characterized as ‘sprawling.’ If population is growing 
more rapidly than land is being consumed for urbanization then [an area] can be characterized as 
‘densifying’”.  
Even though sprawl is not a precise term, several useful measures have been advanced. Sprawl indices 
have been developed by such diverse organizations as the Rutgers University Center for Urban Policy 
Research, Smart Growth America, and USA Today (Burchell et al., 2005). Each index has advantages 
and limitations, a discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article. For the purposes at hand it is 
simply  assumed  that  a  suitable  method  exists  for  measuring  sprawl,  thereby  making  quantitative 
assessment possible.  
3. A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF LAND USE CHANGE 
The land use change model developed here is grounded in economic theory and uses elements of 
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patterns gleaned from empirical studies. In building the framework, it is assumed that land is allocated 
or traded via a market mechanism. Government involvement in land use decisions is therefore viewed 
as an intervention, for better or worse, in the market for land in a given locality. Since the most relevant 
scale for sprawl is the municipal level, the study area is assumed to consist of any land that falls under 
the jurisdiction of a given municipality’s policymakers. “Policymakers” is used here as a general term for 
those who make decisions regarding land use change policy. The land use change decision is assumed 
to be made at the level of the individual parcel by the parcel’s owner or steward. 
Since the model begins with the assumption of the existence of a market mechanism, the demand for 
and supply of land of a given land use type must be specified. It is assumed that an initial stock of land 
exists for each land use type under study, i.e., the supply of each land use type is initially fixed. Supply 
conditions change when government undertakes an action that increases or decreases the supply of 
land in a given use type. Demand for land is driven by the need for land for certain use types, which 
could be broadly categorized into residential use, commercial use, and government use. Within each of 
these there may exist several subcategories. Commercial use might include agricultural land, timber 
land, industrial  land, and  land for trade and commerce; residential land  may be divided into high, 
medium, and low density; government land may be divided into municipal, county or parish, state and 
federal. Demanders of land thus consist of households, business firms, and government agencies. 
Suppliers of land also consist of members of these three broad groups. All parcels are assumed to be 
owned initially by some combination of households, business firms, and government. In addition to 
being primary demanders of land, government may affect the demand side of the market by influencing 
factors that determine household and business demand for land of various use types. This notion will be 
examined more closely in a later section as it represents an area where important linkages may be 
established between various government activities and the land use change process. 
If the initial state at time t is considered an equilibrium state in which the quantity supplied for each land 
use equals the quantity demanded for each land use type, then the land use change process is, in 
economic terms, a process of moving from one equilibrium toward another due to changing market 
conditions. A time period is the amount of time it takes to transition from one equilibrium to another, or 
for each economic agent to examine the available information and to make his or her play accordingly, a 
“play” being to buy, sell, hold, or pass on a given parcel of land. Changes in the relative prices among 
various land use types are what lead to changes in composition of land use in a given study area. This 
postulate follows the pioneering work of J.H. von Thunen (and the later refinements by William Alonso) 
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Following neoclassical theory we may initially assume that the relative prices of the various land use 
types in fact carry all relevant information about the market, and that changes in those relative prices 
reflect changing demand and supply conditions in the market for land of various use types. The price of 
land may be interpreted as “the price for the use of a piece of land” (Hoover and Giarratani, 1984) or, 
equivalently, as “the price of the services yielded by land during the specific time period” (Romanos, 
1976). This coincides with the economic concept of rent or rental income, which is the return to the 
owners of land resources. 
Following a functional model of land use change developed by Bockstael, a given parcel of land in the 
study area, denoted j, which is currently in land use type a, will be converted to land use type i at time 
t+1, if 
(1)  W jit+l|a – C jit+l|a ≥ W jmt+l|a – C jmt+l|a 
for all land uses m = 1,…, M (including a). Wjit+l|a is defined as the present value of the future stream of 
returns on parcel j in state i and time t+1, given that the parcel was in state a in time t. C jit+1|a is defined 
as the cost of converting the parcel from land use type a to land use type i (which is 0 when m = a). A 
parcel is converted to land use type i if the net present value of the future stream of returns to parcel j in 
land use type i (net  meaning less conversion costs) is greater than for all other uses of parcel j, 
including the current use, land use type a (1996). 
The expected return, or expected net rent, for parcel j in land use type a for time period t+1, denoted 
Rjt+l|a, may then be defined as the expected value of Wjit+l|a – C jit+l|a (Bockstael, 1996). When demand for 
land of a particular use type increases, expected net rent increases for the relevant parcels, ceteris 
paribus; ceteris paribus, when demand for land of a particular use type decreases, expected net rent 
decreases for the relevant parcels. Regardless of whether the increase in demand is caused by rising 
population in the study area, rising incomes in the study area (which may lead to shifts in preferences 
regarding housing densities), or shifts in preferences other than those resulting from changing income 
levels, the impact on expected net rent will be in the same direction. A reduction in the supply of land of 
a particular use type will increase the expected net rent, ceteris paribus; ceteris paribus, an increase in 
the supply of land of a particular use type will decrease the expected net rent. 
4. THE POLITCAL INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF LAND USE CHANGE 
In the conceptual framework outlined thus far, government has the ability to affect the demand side of 
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landfills) government may directly affect  the demand for  particular parcels of land surrounding the 
amenities  or  disamenites,  thereby  influencing  the  expected  net  rents  on  those  parcels  relative  to 
unaffected parcels; 2) Government may influence consumer preferences regarding housing density 
(e.g., some may view high density housing and public transit as complementary goods, and so an 
increase in the availability  of public transit may increase the demand for high density housing; 3) 
Through its use of tax incentives or other type or other types of subsidies government may increase the 
demand  for  certain  land use  types  beyond  a  level  the  market  would  have  achieved  otherwise;  4) 
Government is itself a demander of land, and so by increasing or decreasing its consumption of land 
directly affects the demand—and the expected net rent—for land in various use types. 
Within the framework, there are three basic ways in which government may affect the supply side of the 
market for land: 1) By rezoning land from one use type to another, government increases the supply of 
land in the latter use type while decreasing the supply of land in the former use type; 2) By annexing 
land into its political boundaries, government increases the supply of land of the relevant use types; 3) 
Government may make publicly owned land available for private use (e.g., selling portions of public 
forestland), which would increase the supply of land of the relevant use type. 
Government may also impact the expected net return for a particular land use type through actions that 
affect conversion costs, Cjit+1|a. Such action could take the form of permits or fees or other requirements 
that apply disparately to different types of land use conversions, for instance making it more costly to 
convert from land use a to land use b than converting from land use a to land use c, thus reducing the 
relative number of conversions from use a to use b.  
TABLE 1.   POLITICAL INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF LAND USE CHANGE  
Factor Affecting               Impact on Demand or Supply      Impact on Expected Net 
Parcel j in Land Use a             for Parcel j in Land Use a                 Net Rent of Parcel j in Land Use a 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Government Activities 
      Amenities    ↑    Demand  ↑      Rjt+1|a  ↑ 
       Disamenities    ↑    Demand  ↓      Rjt+1|a  ↓ 
       Public transit    ↑    Demand  ↑      Rjt+1|a  ↑ 
       Econ. Growth Efforts  ↑    Demand  ↑      Rjt+1|a  ↑  
       Subsidies    ↑    Demand  ↑      Rjt+1|a  ↑ 
       Government Land Use  ↑    Demand  ↑      Rjt+1|a  ↑ 
       Conversion Fees  ↑    Demand  ↓      Rjt+1|a  ↓ 
       Rezoning of Parcel j for Land Use a    Supply    ↑      Rjt+1|a  ↓ 
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Table  1  summarizes  the  political  institutional  determinants  of  land use  change,  how  each  affects 
demand/supply, and how each impacts the expected net rent for a particular land use type. 
The determinants summarized in Table 1 can be incorporated into the conceptual model of land use 
change represented by equation (1) in a straightforward manner. A given parcel of land in the study 
area, denoted j, which is currently in land use type a, will be converted to land use type i at time t+1, if 
(2) Wjit+l|a – (Cjit+l|a+ Fjit+l|a) + Gjit+l| a  ≥  Wjmt+l|a – (Cjit+l|a+ Fjmt+l|a) + Gjmt+l|a 
for all land uses m=1,…, M (including a). Gjit+l|a is defined as the expected net reduction (or net gain) in 
Wjit+l|a that results from the government activities listed in the left hand column of Table 1 (aside from 
government induced changes in conversion fees, which are addressed separately below). The other 
variables retain the definitions outlined previously. Fjit+l|a is the expected net impact of fees or changes in 
bureaucratic  procedures on Cjit+l|a. Gjit+l|a could be more explicitly modeled, for all parcels j, as follows: 
(3) Gjit+l|a = A – D + O + S + Z + V 
where, 
A = impact of government induced amenities on Wjit+1 
D = impact of government induced disamenities on Wjit+1 
O = net impact of transportation factors on Wjit+1 
S = net impact of subsides/taxes on Wjit+1 
Z = net impact of zoning changes on Wjit+1 
V = net impact on Wjit+1 of changes in government demand/supply of land in the relevant use types. 
Rjt+l|a may then be redefined as the expected value of Wjit+l|a – (Cjit+l|a+ Fjit+l|a) + Gjit+l| a. It bears noting that 
Bockstael’s expression of the basic model, very similar to equation (1) above, does not necessarily 
preclude political institutional factors that affect expected net rents; depending on the data used to 
estimate net rents, the impact of governmental activities could very well be included in the results. 
However, equations (2) and (3) together explicitly incorporate these factors. Though the expression is 
straightforward, such an explicit formulation of the impact of governmental activities on land use change 
has been surprisingly absent from the land use change literature to date. Rather the literature has 
tended to focus on empirical analysis of one or two components of local land use policy, such as the 
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1999, Song and Zenou, 2006 or Su and DeSalvo, 2008) or on the impact of zoning regulations on 
housing prices (see for example Pogodzinski and Sass, 1990 or Quigley and Rosenthal, 2005).  
Using the expanded conceptual model of land use change represented by equations (2) and (3), one 
may make various propositions about government activities that would tend to increase the rate of 
sprawl. Following Burchell et al.’s concept of sprawl and assuming that all j parcel are divided into two 
basic  types—f,  which  would  include  parcels  within  the  current  development  boundaries  (infill  type 
development), and e, which would include parcels at the town edge or beyond the current development 
boundaries—the rate of sprawl for a given locality would increase either when (a) Ret+1 > Rft+1 for a 
sufficient number of the j parcels, or, (b) when development that occurs is at low relative density. 
Government activities that, ceteris paribus, would tend to increase the rate of sprawl through the first 
channel, (a), would include policies that restrict certain kinds of development in type f parcels relative to 
type e parcels, policies that subsidize development in type e parcels relative to type f parcels (e.g. – 
subsidized infrastructure such as utility infrastructure that does not pay for itself given the density of 
development), policies that result in a sub optimal transportation system, which could include a lack of 
public transit and an absence of walkable routes, and policies that impose more costly bureaucratic 
procedures on development in land use type f parcels relative to land use type e parcels. Government 
activities that would tend to increase the rate of sprawl through the second channel, (b), include policies 
that favor lower density development over higher density development in relation to already existing 
development (i.e., limitations on building densities). 
In order to practically apply this model of sprawl it would be necessary to more specifically define the 
term “low relative density.” As a suggestion, new development could be considered low relative density 
if the average density of the new development is below some empirically selected threshold, or if a 
specified percentage of the new development occurs at a lower average density than the average 
density of existing development in the study area. 
The government activities outlined in this section may be taken as a whole to represent the political 
institutional determinants of sprawl. Note that these determinants affect the rate of sprawl in the ways 
mentioned whether policymakers in a given locality are intentionally trying to impact the rate of sprawl in 
their locality or not. 
5. A THEORY OF GOVERNMENT AND SPRAWL 
In developing a theory of government’s impact on sprawl the question of primary interest is whether 
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form that relationship takes. Studies have been conducted providing evidence that land use controls 
affect a locality’s rate of sprawl, as does the local tax structure, the type of infrastructure provided by the 
local government and the degree of political fragmentation in a given area. Pendall (1999) found that 
land use controls that shift development costs onto builders and away from the general public tend to 
reduce sprawl, and that land use controls that mandate low densities increase sprawl. In the same 
study Pendall (1999) found that localities whose local governments rely on ad valorem property taxes to 
fund services and infrastructure tend towards higher rates of sprawl than those that rely on a broader 
tax base. Fulton et al. (2001) found that the rate of sprawl is influenced by infrastructure endowments 
and finance, and specifically that the rate of sprawl is negatively correlated with the endowment of 
public sewer systems and positively correlated with the endowment of public water systems. Fulton et 
al.  (2001)  also  verified  the  work  of  previous  researchers  in  their  finding  that  the  more  politically 
fragmented a locality is the greater its rate of sprawl. In a study indirectly related to sprawl, Galloway 
and Landis (1986) found that cities are more likely to undertake annexations “when state law places its 
annexation  decisions  exclusively  in  the  hands  of  local  governments”  and  less  likely  to  undertake 
annexations when state law requires popular approval of annexation proposals. Levine (1999), in a 
study of 490 California cities and counties, found that local growth management measures “significantly 
displaced new construction, particularly rental housing, possibly exacerbating the expansion of  the 
metropolitan areas into the interiors of the state. Knaap (2000), after a thorough review of the relevant 
literature,  contends  that  “[i]nterventions  by  local  and  metropolitan  governments—for  better  or  for 
worse—usually affect property values. The preponderance of this evidence suggests that this…results 
in a reasonably appropriate separation and mix of land uses, but a density of residential development 
that is excessively low and housing prices and rents that are excessively high”. Knaap (2000) further 
cites studies by planners and economists that “suggest that zoning and other land use regulations, 
especially when adopted and enforced at the local level, tend to result in lower overall urban densities 
and encourage urban sprawl”. This article seeks to add to the existing sprawl literature by establishing a 
solid theoretical link between a municipality’s governance structure and its rate of sprawl. 
5.1. The Sprawl Bias 
Public choice theory views political decisions as being made at the level of the rational, self interested 
individual (see for example Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). The individual of primary interest is the 
policymaker,  and,  in  the  current  context,  the  policymaker  who  makes  or  contributes  to  decisions 
regarding  land use  change  policy.  Breton  (1974)  suggested  that  such  an  individual  “can  be 
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variables such as personal pecuniary gains, personal power, his own image in history, the pursuit of 
lofty personal ideals, his personal view of the common good, and others which are peculiar to each 
politician”. Following Breton (1974), a policymaker’s utility may be expressed as  
(4)  UP = UP (π, v) 
where, 
Up = the utility of the policymaker 
π = the subjective probability of election or reelection 
v’s = the other variables such as personal pecuniary gains, personal view of the common good, etc. 
Stevens (1993) notes that equation (4) “is a very broad and general formulation…and it is consistent 
with many types of behavior; these range from maximizing legal and illegal wealth, on one hand, to 
being a sacrificial lamb for a lost political cause, on the other. If either extreme is followed, however, 
there will be a reduction in the probability of reelection”.  For the purposes of the current context, 
equation (4) may be construed as including policymakers who are appointed rather than elected, and 
thus π would be interpreted as the subjective probability or appointment of reappointment. 
Clearly land use policy can be viewed as a type of government regulation of the market for land. One of 
the earliest modern theories of regulation was advanced by George Stigler (1971), who contended that 
“regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit”. Stigler’s 
model examines producers vis à vis consumers, and concludes that producers have definite advantage 
over consumers in affecting the political process. Producers are usually fewer in number than are 
consumers in a given market, and thus it is less costly for them to organize. Also, firms within a given 
industry are generally more homogenous than their consumers and are likely to already be organized to 
some extent (trade associations are one form such organization may take). Because they are fewer in 
number, producers experience higher per capita gains than the per capita losses that would be imposed 
on  consumers  from  a  given  political  mandate.  For  these  reasons,  as  Stevens  (1993)  notes  of 
policymakers, “[they] are usually ready to cooperate with the producers if it means political support, 
campaign  contributions,  future  employment,  or,  for  some,  bribes.  As  self interested  individuals, 
[policymakers] respond to those demands that surface in the strongest and most coherent form. These 
are the demands of producers because of their small numbers, their superior organization, and their 
high per capita gains”. 
Mancur Olson (1965) cites similar difficulties facing large groups in attempting to undertake collective 
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(1965) is referring largely to special interest groups when he postulates that “a rational individual will not 
incur the cost and trouble of supporting an organization formed to pursue some jointly beneficial goal, in 
circumstances in which his own contribution will make a negligible difference to the result and he can 
enjoy any eventual benefits without contribution”. 
 These concepts advanced by Stigler and Olson, and later expanded upon by others, may be applied to 
the issue of government involvement in the land use change process. If we replace the term “producers” 
in Stigler’s model with the term “land developers,” and the term “consumers” with the term “citizens,” 
then  the  application  becomes  straightforward.  Land  developers,  or  commercial  interests,  would 
constitute one type of special interest group in the land use change process. Citizens’ or grass roots 
type organizations would represent another type of special interest in the land use change process, 
typically assumed to be in opposition to  the policies advocated by the commercial interests. Land 
developers would seek to consume land to the point where profit is maximized, without regards for any 
externalities generated by their consumption of land. To  the extent  that  their consumption of  land 
generates externalities they will over consume land. 
Land developers in a given locality may not be able to consume the quantity consistent with profit 
maximization without government consent—e.g., in the form of zoning variances. Developers tend to be 
better organized and more “in tune” with local political processes than opposing citizens’ groups. The 
citizens’ perspective will most certainly be underrepresented in the political decision making process 
due to the free rider problem cited by Olson. Even in the absence of free riders, a citizens group would 
be  comparatively  more  costly  to  organize  and operate.  Even  a  well meaning  policymaker  will  find 
himself more influenced by commercial interests, because, to reiterate a previously mentioned point 
made by Stevens (1993), “As self interested individuals, [policymakers] respond to those demand that 
surface in the strongest and most coherent form”. Thus,  even in a political system  that is  free of 
corruption,  wherein  policy  decisions  are  made  by  rational  individuals,  there  exists  an  inherent, 
institutional bias in favor of sprawling development.   
The  bias  towards  sprawl  becomes  even  graver  when  corruption  enters  the  system.  Consider  the 
comments of noted public choice economist Gordon Tullock, who likens government involvement in the 
land use change process in the United States to the corrupt operations of local government in China.  
Tullock (1989) asserts, “The zoning system had been adopted by most American cities in the first World 
War…the value of many plots depended heavily on more or less arbitrary decisions by officials of the 
zoning board. Even if the zoning board were completely clean in the sense that no outside influence 
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economics, the individual would have suffered essentially arbitrary decisions…Further, it was certainly 
true that the real estate industry rapidly developed specialists in manipulating the zoning boards. It also 
developed corrupt zoning boards”.   
Tullock is not basing his remarks on an empirical study of zoning boards in the United States; yet his 
point is worth considering. To the extent the v’s in equation (4) represent illegal or unethical pecuniary 
benefits for a given individual, the policymaker is even more likely to decide in favor of commercial 
interests, who are more able and willing (because they are better organized and have a greater per 
capita incentive) to offer such pecuniary benefits. Therefore, the more corrupt a zoning board is, the 
greater will be its tendency to favor sprawling development.  
The assertion that there exists an institutional or governmental bias towards sprawl is a fairly bold one. 
It implies that less sprawl would exist if there were no government involvement in the land use change 
process whatsoever, which at first blush may seem counterintuitive. It could be argued that the very 
purpose of zoning regulations is to maintain reasonable growth boundaries and to prevent certain types 
of locational externalities. However, it cannot be denied that zoning regulations affect land values. 
Certain zoning regulations suppress land values, particularly for land that is not zoned for residential or 
commercial development. Land developers may acquire land at artificially suppressed values and then, 
through the political process, receive variances or changes in zoning laws that increase the land values. 
If initially there had not been any government restrictions on the land, its value, or price, might have 
been high enough to prevent a developer from purchasing it for development. In other words, the 
expected net return would have been too low for the developer to consider purchasing the given parcel; 
government involvement increases the expected net return. So, indeed, zoning regulations, along with a 
political system that favors commercial interests, work in tandem to increase sprawl beyond the level 
that would exist if there were no government involvement in the land use change process whatsoever. 
Further compounding this situation are other pro sprawl policies, which may be separate and aside from 
zoning regulations and variances. For example, a local government may increase the rate of sprawl in 
its locality by providing subsidized infrastructure, or by offering tax incentives to particular developers, or 
by creating a transportation system that is conducive to sprawling development.   
As outlined earlier in this section, previous research suggests that there is indeed an institutional bias 
towards sprawl (although the authors of  those works have refrained from referring to it as a bias 
outright). Part of the sprawl bias hypothesis may be tested by searching newspaper articles and/or court 
documents related to cases in which proposed developments were contested by citizens’ groups. Such 
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citizen’s groups contesting the development. Anecdotal evidence suggests that commercial interests 
prevail in contested cases regarding land development more frequently than do citizens’ or grass roots 
type interests. 
If it is true that local governments have some bearing on the level of sprawl in their localities, as has 
been asserted here, then there undoubtedly exists some variation across governments and localities. 
Not  all  governments  likely  contribute  to  sprawl  in  their  given  localities  to  the  same  degree.  Such 
variation could exist due to varying degrees of government failure—or inbuilt bias towards sprawl—and 
the varying manner in which land use externalities are addressed. It is also plausible that governance 
structure makes a difference. For example, it is possible that localities with elected policymakers tend to 
exhibit lower rates of sprawl than localities where policymakers are appointed. This elected versus 
appointed hypothesis is supported to an extent by a previously mentioned study of how state law affects 
a city’s annexation decisions. To reiterate the point, the study authors, Galloway and Landis (1986), 
found  that  cities  are  more  likely    to  undertake  annexations  “when  state  law  places  in  annexation 
decisions exclusively in the hands of local governments,” and less likely to undertake annexations when 
state law requires popular approval of annexation proposals. The Galloway Landis study suggests a 
divergence  between  citizens’  desires  and  political  outcomes—at  least  in  terms  of  annexation 
decisions—when such decisions are made less democratically. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Many authors have acknowledged the importance of political institutional factors in the land use change 
process, yet the literature has been lacking a theoretical framework for analyzing those factors. This 
article combines existing land use change modeling theory with some applications of public choice 
theory to create such a framework. Several political institutional determinants of land use change are 
identified,  and  a  conceptual  model  of  land use  change  is  developed  that  incorporates  these 
determinants.  The  conceptual  model  developed  herein  is  used  to  analyze  local  government’s 
contribution to sprawl. The argument is made that an institutional bias toward sprawling development 
exists, and that in fact sprawl is magnified by government involvement in the land use change process.  
Empirical work should be done to validate the model. Several propositions are made for testing various 
aspects of the proposed conceptual model and its derivative hypotheses. If the hypothesis regarding an 
institutional bias towards sprawl is borne out, there are important public policy implications. Although 
previous  empirical  research  seems  to  indicate  that  the  sprawl  bias  is  real,  the  conceptual  model 
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It bears noting that the degree of the institutional bias towards sprawl is dependent to some extent on 
the availability of information. In an information rich environment, citizens will better understand the true 
costs of the negative externalities imposed on them by sprawling development, and thus will have a 
greater  incentive  to  express  their  views  politically.  Therefore,  it  is  not  a  forgone  conclusion  that 
commercial interests will always win a political wrestling match over proposed land developments. One 
could imagine a scenario in which great number of citizens would choose to become politically involved. 
For instance, suppose a commercial developer proposed building a toxic waste dump in close proximity 
to a city park. Such a proposal would stand little chance of seeing the light of day. Citizens have some 
information, real and imagined, regarding the externalities associated with a toxic waste dump. On the 
contrary, the externalities associated with most proposed developments are largely invisible to  the 
average citizen. This lack of information thus contributes to the institutional bias towards sprawl. A full 
treatment of the informational aspects of the framework presented here is well beyond the scope of this 
article; however, such an analysis is warranted, and would be necessary in arriving at a complete theory 
of the political institutional dimensions of land use change.  
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